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The Classical Approach to Convergence Analysis

Abstract: The concepts of a-convergence, absolute P-convergence and conditional P-convergence
are discussed in this paper. The concepts are applied to a variety of data sets that include a large
cross-section of 110 countries, the sub-sample of OECD countries, the states within the United
States, the prefectures ofJapan, the regions within several European countries. Except for the
large cross-section ofcountries, all data sets display strong evidence ofa-convergence and
absolute P-convergence. The cross-section of countries exhibits a-divergence and conditional P
convergence. The speed ofconditional convergence, which is very similar across data sets, is
close to two percent per year.
Key Words: Convergence, Regional Economic Growth, Neoclassical Growth, Endogenous
Growth.
JEL Classification: 040, 041, 051, 052, 053.

1. Introduction

The existence ofconvergence across economic units is an important economic question.
Labor and public finance economists want to know whether relatively poor families will remain
poor for many generations and whether the dynasties that will be rich in a hundred years are the
same ones that are rich today. They also want to know whether the degree ofincome inequality
across families increases or falls over time. The reason for finding these questions interesting are
obvious to anyone interested in general welfare and to policy-makers who want to engage in
redistributive policies and efforts to achieve social peace.
Macroeconomists and theorists of economic growth are interested in exactly the same
questions. For them, however, the relevant unit of analysis is not the family but rather the country
or the region within a country. For example, they want to know whether, in our world, rich
.

countries will remain rich and poor countries will remain poor for many decades. They are also
interested in knowing whether the distribution ofworld income and output across countries is
becoming increasingly equal over time.
These important questions lie at the heart of the convergence debate. Even though
economists have been interested in these issues for many decades, it was not until the end ofthe
1980s that the convergence debate captured the attention ofmainstream macroeconomic theorists
and econometricians. In addition to the inherent importance ofthe questions dealt with, the
reason for this sudden increase in interest was two-fold. First, the existence ofconvergence
across economies was proposed as the main way to test the validity ofmodem theories of
economic growth. Moreover, estimates ofthe speeds ofconvergence across economies (to be
more precisely defined in a later section) were thought to provide information on one ofthe key
I

parameters ofgrowth theory: the share of capital in the production function (see the discussion in
Section 4). For this reason, growth theorists started paying close attention to the evolution ofthe
convergence debate. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the data set on internationally
comparable GDP levels for a large number ofcountries became ready for use in the mid 1980s1.
This new data set allowed empirical economists to compare GDP levels across a large number of
countries economies and to look at the evolution ofthese levels over time, a necessary feature for
the study ofthe convergence hypothesis.
In this paper I shall discuss the classical approach to convergence analysis. I call this the

classical approach because it was the first methodology to be used in the literature and because it
uses the traditional techniques of classical econometrics, a feature that is shared by some, but not
all, ofthe alternative approaches. Perhaps more importantly, like classical music or classical
paintings, it is the basis ofreference and target of criticism ofall other methodologies. And also
like classical art, it has survived and will keep surviving the challenges ofmore modem and
"surrealist" movements.
The rest ofthe paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces two useful definitions
of convergence and highlights their similarities and differences. Section 3 analyzes some evidence
on convergence using a sample of 110 economies. In section 4 I interpret the above evidence in
light ofthe neoclassical model and introduce the concept ofconditional convergence. Section 5
applies the concept ofconditional convergence to the sample of 110 countries. Section 6
provides evidence on convergence for number ofregional data sets. I conclude in section 7.

1

The University ofPennsylvania project was originally started in the 1960s by A
Kravis and was finished by Allan Heston and Robert Summers (see Summers and Heston [1991].)
2

2. Definitions of Convergence.

Two main concepts of convergence appear in the classical literature. They are called P
convergence and a-convergence. 2 We say that there is absolute ~onvergence ifpoor
economies terui to growfaster than rich ones. 3 Imagine that we have data on real per capita GDP

for a cross-section ofeconomies between years t and t+ T. If we estimate the following regression

where y;.,. t+T = log (y;. t+T I y;.,) / T is economy i's growth rate ofGDP between t and t+ T,

.

and log(y 1

,)

is the logarithm ofeconomy i's GDP per capita at time t and we find P>O, then we

say that the data set exhibits absolute P-convergence..
The concept ofa-convergence can be defined as follows: a group ofeconomies are
converging in the sense of u if the dispersion oftheir realper capita GDP levels tends to
decrease over time. That is, if

where a, is the time t standard deviation of log(y;,) across i. 4 The concepts of a- and absolute
2

This tenninology was first introduced in Sala-i-Martin [1990].

3

In a later section I will introduce the important concept ofconditional P-convergence.

4

The standard deviation ofthe logarithm of GDP per capita is invariant with the mean.
In this regard, it is similar to the coefficient ofvariation ofthe level ofGDP per capita, which is
3

P-convergence are, of course, related. If we take the sample variance of log(y,,) from (1), we will
get a relation between a. and ar+Twhich depends on p. Intuitively, we can see that if the GDP
levels oftwo economies become more similar over time, it must be the case that the poor
economy grows faster. As an illustration, Figure 1 displays the behavior ofthe log ofGDP per
capita for two economies over time. Economy A starts out being richer than economy B. There
is an initial distance or dispersion between the two levels ofincome. In Panel A, the growth rate
ofeconomy A is smaller than the growth rate of economy B between times t and t+ T and,
therefore, we say that there is P-convergence. Since dispersion at t+ Tis smaller than at time t,
we also say that there is a-convergence. Note that it is impossible for the two economies to be
closer together at t+ T without having the poor economy (in this case economy B) growing faster.
In other words, a necessary conditionfor the existence of(I-Convergence is the existence of P

convergence.
Moreover, it is natural to think that when a poor economy grows faster than a rich one,
then the levels ofGDP per capita ofthe two economies will become more similar over time. In
other words, the existence ofP-convergence will tend to generate (I-Convergence. Panel A in
Figure 1 is an example where P-convergence exists and is associated with a-convergence. Panel
B provides an example where the lack of P-convergence (the rich economy grows faster) is
associated with the lack ofa-convergence (the distance between economies increases over time).
Hence, it would appear that the two concepts are identical. However, at the theoretical leve~ it is
possible for poor countries to grow faster than rich ones, without observing that the cross
sectional dispersion fall over time. That is, we could in principle find P-convergence without
equal to the standard deviation ofthe level divided by the mean.
4

finding a-convergence. In Panel C, for example, I have constructed and example where the poor
economy grows faster so there is P-convergence. However, the growth rate ofB is so much
larger than the growth rate of A that, at time t+ T, B is richer than A In fact, the example is such
that, at time t+ T, the distance between A and B is the same as it was at time t (except that now
the rich economy is B). Hence, the dispersion between these two economies has not fallen so
there is no a-convergence. In fact I could have constructed the example so that the dispersion at
t+ Twas larger than at t. In that case there would have been a-divergence

despite the fact of

there being P-convergence. It follows that P-convergence, although necessary, is not a sufficient
condition for a-convergence.
The reason why the two concepts ofconvergence do not always show up together is that
they capture two different aspects ofthe world. a-convergence relates to whether the cross

country distribution ofworld income shrinks over time or not. P-convergence, on the other hand,
relates to the mobility ofthe different economies within the given distribution ofworld income.
Panels A and B are examples where the movements ofthe various economies over time changes
the final distribution ofincome. Panel C, on the other hand, is an example where there is mobility
within the distribution, but the distribution itselfremains unchanged. 5
5

This possibility led some economists (most prominently Quah [1993]) to criticize the
classical approach on three grounds. First they suggested that the classical analysts were
confusing the two concepts of convergence. Second, they suggested that the only meaningful
concept ofconvergence was that of a. And finally, they said that the concept of P-convergence
conveyed no interesting information about a-convergence (or about anything else) so it should
not be studied. The three points were wrong. First, classical analysts were well aware ofthe
distinction from the very beginning (see for example Easterlin [1960], Sala-i-Martin [1990] and
Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1992].) In fact, that's why they made the distinction in the first place!
Second, the intra-distributional mobility (reflected in P) is at least as interesting as the behavior of
the distribution itself(reflected in o). Surprisingly, Quah [1994] highlights the importance of
intra-distributional mobility in the context of stochastic Kernel estimators. And finally, p provides
5

Having made the theoretical distinction between a and

Pconvergence, I would like to

mention at this point that, in practice, this distinction is not as important. The reason is that, when
it comes to real world data, whenever we observe a-convergence, we also observe P
convergence. However, since we can only say this after we have analyzed the data, throughout
the rest ofthe paper I will follow the classical literature, and I will analyze the two concepts of
convergence for every data set.

3. Cross-Country Evidence

Maddison [1991] provided data on GDP levels across a cross-section of 13 rich countries
starting in 1870. These data were constructed following the methodology ofthe U.N.'s
International Comparison Project (ICP) so, in principle, the data across countries can be
compared and are, therefore, suitable for use in the analysis ofconvergence. The main
disadvantage ofthese data is that they are available for rich countries only, a problem that proved
fatal for the study of convergence. Using Maddison's data, Baumol [1986] documented the
existence of cross-country convergence. He found that convergence was especially strong after
world war II. This evidence, however, was quickly downplayed by Romer [1986] and DeLong
[1988] on the grounds of ex-post sample selection bias. By working with Maddison's data set of
nations which were industrialized ex-post (that is, by 1979), those nations that did not converge
were excluded from the sample, so convergence in Baumol's study was all but guaranteed. As
soon as the data set was expanded to include countries that appeared rich ex-ante (that is, by

information about a to the extent that any necessary condition does. The fact that the two
phenomena tend to appear together in most data sets seems to support this view.
6

1870)6 the evidence for convergence quickly disappeared.
The solution to the sample selection problem was to analyze a larger set of countries. This
is where the newly created Summers-Heston data set came in handy. This data set involved GDP
levels for more than one hundred countries. Unlike Maddison's project, however, where the time
series dimension ofthe data was quite large, the first year for which the Summers and Heston data
is available is 1960. Hence, by using the Summers-Heston data set analysts could study a broader
set ofcountries, but the cost was a much shorter time span. In Figure 2 I display the behavior of
the dispersion of GDP per capita for the set of 110 countries for which I have data in all years
between 1960 and 1990. Note that the dispersion, a, increases steadily :from a=0.89 in 1960 to
a=l.12 in 1980. The cross-country distribution ofworld income has become increasingly
unequal: we live in a world where economies have diverged (in the sense of a) over the last 30
years.
Figure 3 analyzes the existence of '3-convergence across the same set of 110 economies.
On the horizontal axis, I display the log ofGDP per capita in 1960. On the vertical axis, I depict
the growth rate between 1960 and 1990. The figure shows that the relation between growth and
the initial level ofGDP is not negative. In fact, the slope ofthe regression (also shown in the
figure) is positive, although the fit is far :from impressive.
In order to quantify the lack ofconvergence across these 110 countries, I estimate the

following non-linear equation

6

This sample would include countries that appeared rich in 1870 but whose performance
in the following century was not spectacular (Spain, Argentina, or Ireland would examples ofsuch
countries) and would exclude countries that were poor in 1870, but have become surprising
successes ex post (like, for example, Japan). See DeLong [1988] and Baumol and Wolff[1988].
7

(3 )

Yi,t,t+T

= a - (

1-e-P·T)
T
·log(y;) + e,,,,t+T ·

The reason for estimating (3) instead ofthe linear version that appears in (1) is that I want to
compare the speed ofconvergence across data sets that have different time lengths. The OLS
coefficient in (1) would be inversely related to T (the length ofthe period over which I compute
the growth rate.) The reason is that, ifthere is convergence, the growth rate should fall over time
(because when the economy i_s richer, the growth rate is predicted to be smaller.) When we
average long periods oftime, we combine early periods with large growth rates with later periods
with small growth rates. Hence, the growth rate predicted by the original (low) level ofincome is
smaller the longer the time period of analysis. Note that as T goes to infinity, the coefficient on
the linear regression (1) goes to zero. As T goes to zero (that is as the time period ofanalysis
becomes short) the coefficients in the linear and non-linear equations coincide. Since the
coefficient Pin the non-linear regression is invariant to the length ofthe sample, I will estimate the
non-linear equation 1 from here on.
A second reason for estimating the non-linear equation (3) instead of(l) is that, as I will
argue in the next section, the convergence hypothesis has been discussed in the context ofmodels
ofgrowth. The log-linearization ofneoclassical model around its steady state yields an equation
like (3). In that context, the parameter Pcan be interpreted as the speed ofinstantaneous
convergence ofan economy towards its steady-state position. I will therefore estimate (3) and I
will call Pthe speed of convergence.

8

Table 1 reports the estimated speed ofconvergence,

p, for a variety of data sets under

three different setups. The first row relates to the large sample of 110 countries. The first
column refers to the estimate of pwhen a single equation is estimated for the whole time period
and no other explanatory variable is included. Each box in this table contains four numbers. The
first one is the estimate of p. The number just below (in parentheses) is its standard error. To its
right, we have the adjusted R2 ofthe regression and below the R2, the standard error ofthe
regression. The estimated speed of convergence for the cross-section of 110 countries is
negative, P=-0.004 (s.e.=0.002), so the relation between growth and initial income is positive as
shown in Figure 3. The R2 is 0.04 and the standard error ofthe regression is 0.0176. During this
period of30 years, therefore, poor economies did not grow faster than rich ones. The set of110
countries in the world did not converge in the sense of P.

4. Interpretation of these findings in the light of Models of Economic Growth: Absolute
versus Conditional Convergence

The lack of convergence across countries is an interesting finding on various grounds. It
says that, in our world, the degree ofcross-country income inequality not only does not tend to
disappear, but rather tends to increase over time. It also suggests that the countries that are
predicted to be richer a few decades from now are the same countries that are rich today. These
findings may be used by economists or politicians to devise international institutions of
cooperation or help that tend to overturn this somber tendency.
These findings were also seen by growth theorists in the middle ofthe 1980s as evidence
against the neoclassical model ofRamsey [1928], Solow [1956], Cass [1965], and Koopmans
9

[1965], and as support for their new models of endogenous growth. The intuition behind this
conclusion is the following: the assumption ofdiminishing returns to capital implicit in the
neoclassical production function has the prediction that the rate ofreturn to capital (and therefore
the growth rate of capital) is very large when the stock ofcapital is small and vice versa. If the
only difference across countries is their initial levels ofcapital, then the prediction of the

neoclassical growth model is that poor countries with little amounts ofcapital will be poor and
will grow faster than rich countries with large amounts ofcapital, so there will be cross-country
P-convergence. Since the model does not predict the type ofovershooting displayed by the
economies in Figure l's Panel C, the prediction of P-convergence will tend to be associated with a
reduction ofcross-economy dispersion over time, i.e a-convergence.
More precisely, consider a neoclassical model with a Cobb Douglas production function
Y;. t = A /K~ ;L

:,-t ,where Y1,, is economy i's aggregate output at time t, K1,, and L1,, are the

stock ofcapital and labor in that economy respectively, and A, is the level oftechnology.
Following Solow [1956], suppose that the saving rate in this economy is constant (the key results
do not depend on this assumption) and that the rate ofdepreciation ofK is a, the rate of
population growth is n and the rate ofproductivity growth is x. The dynamic equation that
characterizes the behavior ofeconomy i over time says that capital accumulation is the diqerence

..

between overall savings and effective depreciation. Ifwe log-linearize this dynamic equation
around the steady state, we find that the growth rate ofeconomy i between periods t and t+ Tis
given by (3). Moreover, the parameter Pis exactly equal to·

l

(4)

~ =

(1 - a) · (a + n + x) ,

where a is again the capital share in the production function. 7 Since, according to the neoclassical
model, O<a<l, the prediction is that P>O. In other words, the neoclassical model predicts
convergence.
This prediction contrasts with the implications ofthe first generation ofmodels of
endogenous growth (see, for example, Romer [1986] and Rebelo [1990].) These models rely on
the existence ofexternalities, increasing returns and the lack ofinputs that cannot be
accumulated. 8 The key point ofthese new models is the absence ofdiminishing returns to capital
(the concept ofcapital should be understood in a broad sense that includes human capital) so
these models do not exhibit the convergence property. In terms ofequation (4), the one sector
models ofendogenous growth are similar to the neoclassical model except that a has a value of 1.
Note that if a=l, equation (4) then says that the speed ofconvergence should be p=0. For this
reason, in the mid-1980s, the lack ofconvergence across countries was seen as evidence against
the neoclassical model and in favor ofthe new models ofendogenous growth (see for example,
Romer [1986] and Rebelo [1990].)9

7

See Barro and Sala-i-Martin ,[1995, chapter 1] for a derivation ofthis result. See also
Chapter 2 ofthe same book for the extension ofthis result to the optimizing version ofthe
neoclassical model.
8

Labor, which is not purposely accumulated in the neoclassical model is often substituted
with human capital, whose stock increases in accordance with the investment decisions ofprivate
agents.
Equation (4) is interesting for another reason. The parameters a, n and x can be
estimated fairly closely. Hence, ifwe have an estimate of P, we will indirectly have an estimate of
the capital share, a. This particular parameter is very important because the first generation of
9

11

The Absolute Co11Vergence Fallacy.
The argument that says that the neoclassical model predicts convergence relies heavily on
the key assumption that the only difference across countries was their initial levels ofcapital. In
the real world, however, economies may differ in other things such as their levels of~ or their
propensities to save. If different economies have different parameters, then they will have
different steady states and the above argument (developed by the early theorists of endogenous
growth) will be flawed. The intuition can be captured by a simple two-economy example.
Imagine that the first economy is poor but is in the steady state. Accordingly, its growth rate is
zero. The second economy is richer, but has a capital stock below its steady-state level. The
model predicts that its growth rate is positive and, therefore, will be larger than the growth rate of
the first economy, even though the first economy is poorer! What the model says is that, as the
capital stock ofthe growing economy increases, its growth rate will decline and go to zero as the
economy reaches the steady·state. Hence, the prediction ofthe neoclassical model is that the
growth rate ofan economy will be negatively related to the distance that separates it from its own
steady state. This is the concept known in the classical literature10 as conditional ~011Vergence

models ofendogenous growth highlighted the importance ofphysical capital externalities and the
existence ofhuman capital. This meant that the traditional way to compute the capital share by
using income shares was incorrect. Since the exact size ofthe externalities was unknown and the
fraction oflabor that could be accumulated in the form ofhuman capital was also unknown, the
relevant capital share (whose size was seen as crucial from a theoretical point ofview) remained
unknown. Equation (4) says that the convergence literature can provide an indirect way to say
something about the size of a.
10

See Sala-i-Martin [1990], Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1992] and Mankiw , Romer and
Weil [1992].
12

(the concept of P-convergence discussed above is sometimes called absolute convergence to
distinguish it from its new conditional counterpart.) Only if all the economies converge to the
same steady state does the prediction that poor economies should grow faster than rich ones hold
true. The reason is that, in that case, poor economies will be unambiguously farther away from
their steady state. Put in another way, only if all the economies have the same steady state, do the

conditional convergence and the absolute convergence hypotheses coincide. Since the
neoclassical model predicts conditional convergence, the evidence on absolute convergence
discussed in the previous section says little about the validity ofthe model in the real world.
To test the hypothesis of conditional convergence one has to, somehow, hold constant the
steady state. Classical analysts have tried to hold the steady state constant in two different ways.
The first one is the introduction ofvariables that proxy for the steady state in a regression like (1)
or (3). In other words, instead of estimating (1) or (3) one estimates
1-e -l}·T]
(5) Y, ,, , t+T = a - ( - T - · log(y, , ,) + "1 · X, , r + e, ,, , t+T

where X;,, is a vector ofvariables that hold constant the steady state. If the estimate of p is
positive, once X;,, is held constant, then we say that the data set exhibits conditional P

convergence. In section 5 I will use this first approach to condition the data.
The second way to hold constant the steady state is to restrict the convergence study to
sets ofeconomies for which the assumption of similar steady state is not unrealistic. For example,
because we think that the technology, institutions, and tastes ofthe African economies are very
different from those ofJapan or the United States, the assumption that these economies converge
13

to the same steady state is not realistic. However, the technological and institutional differences
across regions within a country or across "similar'' countries (like, for example, those ofthe
OECD) are probably smaller. Hence, we may want to look for absolute convergence within these
set of"more similar'' economies. This second approach is used in section 6.

S. Conditional Convergence (I): Multiple Regression Analysis.

The concept of conditional ~onvergence defined above suggests the estimation ofa
multiple regression like (5). If the neoclassical model is correct and the vector X successfully
holds constant the steady state, we should find a positive p. The key, therefore, is to find
.variables that proxy for the steady state and economic theory should guide our search for such
variables. Different versions ofthe neoclassical model suggest different variables. The strict
version ofthe Solow model, for example, says that steady state depends onthe level of
technology, A, the saving rate, and the parameters o, n, and x. A broad interpretation of
"technology" would allow A to capture various types ofdistortions (public or otherwise), political
variables, etc. Following Barro [1991], a large literature has estimated equations like (5). In this
literature, more than 50 variables have been used in this type of analysis (and found to be
significant in at least one regression). 11 The key point is that, once some variables that can proxy
for the steady state are held constant, the estimate of Pbecomes significantly positive, as
predicted by the neoclassical theory. This finding is robust to the exact choice ofX 12 For
11

See for example, Mankiw, Romer and Weil [1992], Levine and Renelt [1992] and
Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995, chapter 12].
12

The existence of convergence is less strong during the 1980s, a phenomenon that holds
true for almost all data sets analyzed in this paper. See Levine and Renelt [1992] for some ·
14

example, columns 2 and 3 ofTable 1 report the estimate of P when additional variables are held
constant. In this particular case, the primary and secondary school enrollments, the saving rate, .
and some political variables are used as the vector X Note that, unlike column 1, the estimate of
Pis now positive and significant, p=0.013 (s.e.=0.004). Column 3 divides the sample period
1960-1990 into two subperiods and estimates p by restricting it to be the same across sub
periods. The estimated pis 0.025 (s.e.=0.003).
The conclusion is that the sample of 110 countries in the world displays conditional P
convergence. Furthermore, the estimated speed of conditional convergence is close to 2 percent
per year. I should emphasize, however, that this does not mean that poor economies grow faster
or that the world distribution ofincome is shrinking. These are phenomena captured by the
concepts ofabsolute P-convergence and a-convergence and, in this sense, the set ofeconomies
diverges unambiguously. What this evidence says is that economies seem to approach some long
run level ofincome which is captured by the vector ofvariables X, and the growth rate falls as the

economy approaches this long-run level.

6. Conditional Convergence (II): Regional Evidence.
The second method for "holding constant the steady state" is to analyze sets ofeconomies
that appear similar to the researcher so that the assumption ofthe same steady state is reasonable.
For example, OECD economies, and regions within countries could be considered as similar ex
ante. The neoclassical theory that guided our analysis suggests that, if it is true that these sets of
. economies are similar, we should find that these data sets display absolute P-convergence as well
evidence on this point.
15

as a-convergence. If evidence ofabsolute ~-convergence is to be found anywhere, it will be in
these data sets. 13

OECD Economies

Figures 2 and 3 also display the convergence behavior of a subset ofthe world sample: the
OECD countries. In Figure 2, I plot the cross-sectional dispersion of GDP per capita for OECD
economies starting in 1950. 14 In 1950, the dispersion was equal to o=0.60. By 1960, the
coefficient ofdispersion for the OECD countries, o=O .51, was much smaller than that ofthe
world, o=0.89. Contrary to what happened to the broad cross-section ofcountries, OECD
dispersion falls steadily between 1950 and 1975. At that point, it reaches a value of 0 =0.37.
1975
Between 1975 and 1985, the dispersion of GDP across OECD economies increases slightly
(01980=0.38

and 0 1985=0.39}. After 1985, the process ofa-convergence resumes so and the

dispersion in 1990 becomes lower than it was in 1975, 0 1990=0.36. The conclusion is that the
sample ofOECD economies has converged in the sense of a. Figure 3 also highlights the
differential behavior of OECD economies (which are denoted by black dots). For these
countries, the relation between growth and the initial level ofincome is significantly negative as
depicted in Figure 3 by the downward-sloping regression line. OECD economies have thus also
13

These data sets include economies that are open in the sense that capital flows across
economies within the data set. Thus, evidence on convergence cannot be directly interpreted in
the light ofthe closed economy neoclassical growth model. However, Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i
Martin [1995] amend the neoclassical model to allow for partial capital mobility. They show that
this version ofthe neoclassical model predicts the same type ofdynamics as the strict closed
economy version.
14

The reason for starting in 1950 is that data are available for all 24 OECD economies in
1950. This is not true for the 110 countries that constitute the world data set.
16

converged in the sense of P. 15 The exact estimate ofthe speed ofabsolute P-convergence can be
found in the second row ofTable 1. When no other variables are held constant, the estimated
speed ofconvergence is P=0.014 (s.e.=0.003). Hence, OECD economies exhibit absolute P
convergence. When additional conditioning variables are held constant (column 2 in Table 1), the
estimated P is 0.029 (s.e.=0.008). Hence, the estimated speed of convergence across OECD
economies is around 2 per cent per year. 16
Dowrick and N'Guyen [1989] add to this evidence by using various measures of
productivity. They show that, not only do GDP levels per capita converge across OECD
economies, but so do the levels of productivity.

The States ofthe United States.
The third row ofTable 1 shows estimates ofequation (3) for 48 U.S. states for the period
1880 to 1990.17 The first and second columns report the estimate for a single long sample
(1880-1990). Column 1 uses the initial level ofincome as the ONLY explanatory variable. The

15

The OECD was founded in 1961 and its original membership included 20 countries.
Today, the OECD has 24 members. Australia, Finland, Japan and New Zealand joined the
Organization later on, and one could argue that they did so because they had become rich ex-post.
Hence, one could argue that, to some extent, the sample ofOECD economies is subject to the
sample selection bias critique used by Romer [1986] and DeLong [1988] against Baumol [1986].
The elimination ofthese four countries from the sample, however, does not change the main
conclusion: OECD countries have converged both in the sense of a and in the sense of p.
16

The existence ofclassical measurement error could deliver a negative relation between
growth and the initial level ofincome. Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1992] show that this is an
unlikely explanation for the finding of P-convergence. Measurement error, on the other hand,
cannot explain the existence ofa-convergence.
17

See Easterlin [1960], Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1992, 1995, chapter 11].
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estimated speed of convergence is P=0.021 (s.e.=0.0003). The good fit {R2=0.89) can be
appreciated by looking at Figure 4, which is a scatter plot ofthe average growth rate ofincome
per capita between 1880 and 1990 versus the log ofincome per capita in 1880. Column 2 includes
some additional explanatory variables such as the share ofagriculture and mining in total income
as well as some regional dummies. These variables have little effect on the estimates of P over the
long run. The point estimate in this case is 0.017 (s.e.=0.0026).
The third column reports the estimated P when the overall sample period is divided into
sets of 10 year pieces (20 years for 1880 to 1900 and 1900 to 1920). I restrict the estimate of p
over time, but allow for time fixed-effects. I also hold constant the shares ofincome originating
in agriculture and industry to proxy for sectoral shocks that affect growth in the short run. The
restricted point estimate of Pis 0.022 (s.e.=0.002). Thus, the estimated speed ofconvergence
across states in the United States is similar to that ofOECD economies: about 2 percent per year.
Figure 5 shows the cross-sectional standard deviation for the log ofper capita personal
income net oftransfers for 48 U.S. states from 1880 to 1992. We observe that the dispersion
declined from 0.54 in 1880 to 0.33 in 1920, but then rose to 0.40 in 1930. This rise reflects the
adverse shock to agriculture during the 1920s: the agricultural states were relatively poor in 1920
and suffered a further reduction in income due to the fall in agricultural prices. After the 1920s
shock, dispersion fell to 0.35 in 1940, 0.24 in 1950, 0.21 in 1960, 0.17 in 1970, and reached a low
point of0.14 in 1976. The long-run decline stopped in the mid-1970s, after the oil shock, and at
rose to 0.15 in 1980 and 0.19 in 1988. The rise in income dispersion was reversed in the last two
years ofthe 1980s and continued to fall through 1992.
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Japanese Prefectures.
The fourth row of Table 1 reports similar estimates for 47 Japanese prefectures for the
period 1955-1987. 18 As for the United States, the first and second columns correspond to a single
regression for the entire sample period which, in the case ofJapan, is 1955-1990. Column 1
estimates p with the initial level ofincome as the sole explanatory variable. The estimated
coefficient is 0.019 (s.e.=0.003). Column 2 adds some sectoral variables (such as the fraction of
income originating in agriculture or industry), but they do not affect the estimated p. The
estimates reported in Table 1 use data starting in 1955 because income data by sector are not
available before that date. Income data, however, are available from 1930. Ifwe use the 1930
data, the estimated speed of convergence would be 0.027 (s.e.=0.003). The good fit can be
appreciated in Figure 6. The evidently strong negative correlation between the growth rate from
1930 to 1990 and the log ofper capita income in 1930 confirms the existence of absolute
P-convergence across the Japanese prefectures.
To assess the extent to which there has been a-convergence across prefectures in Japan, I
compute a, for the 47 prefectures from 1930 to 1990. Figure 7 shows that the dispersion of
personal income increased from 0.47 in 1930 to 0.63 in 1940. After 1940, the cross-prefectural
dispersion decreased dramatically after: it fell to 0.29 by 1950, to 0.25 in 1960, to 0.23 in 1970
and hit a minimum of 0.125 in 1978. It increased slightly afterwards: a, rose to 0.13 in 1980,
0.14 in 1985 and 0.15 in 1987. Income dispersion has been relatively constant since then. Note
that Japan shares with the United States and the set ofOECD economies the phenomenon ofa
divergence during a decade that starts somewhere in the mid-1970s.
18

See Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995, chapter 11] and Shioji [1994].
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European Regions

Rows 5 through 10 in Table 1 refer to P-convergence across regions within five European
countries (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain). 19 The fifth row relates to the
estimate of p for a sample of40 years, 1950-1990, when the speeds of convergence are restricted
across the 90 regions and over time. The estimate does, however, allow for country fixed-effects.
The estimated pis 0.015 (s.e.=0.002). The third column shows that the panel estimates of Pis
0.031 (s.e.=0.004). Again, these estimates lie in the neighborhood ofthe 2 percent per year found
in the previous data sets.
Figure 8 shows the results on P-convergence visually. The values shown are all measured
relative to the means ofthe respective countries. The figure shows the type of negative relation
that is familiar from the U.S. states and Japanese prefectures. The correlation between the growth
rate and the log ofinitial per capita GDP in Figure 5 is -0.72. Because the underlying numbers
are expressed relative to own-country means, the relation in Figure 8 pertains to P-convergence
within countries rather than between countries, and corresponds to the estimates reported in
column 1 ofTable 1.
Separate estimates for the long sample for each ofthe five countries are reported in
columns 1 and 2 for the next five rows. The estimates range from 0.010 (s.e.=0.003) for Italy to
0.030 (s.e.=0.007) for the UK. The restricted panel estimates for the individual countries are
reported in Column 3. It is interesting to note that the individual point estimates are all close to
0.020 or two percent per year. They range from 0.015 for France to 0.029 for the United

19

See Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995, chapter 11]. See also Dolado, Gonz.alez-Paramo
and Roldan [1994] for a careful study ofthe Spanish case.
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Kingdom.
Figure 9 shows the behavior of a. for the regions within each country. The countries are
always ranked, from highest to lowest, as Italy, Spain, Germany, France, and the United
Kingdom. The overall pattern shows declines in a. over time for each country, although little net
change has occurred since 1970 for Germany and the United Kingdom. In particular, the rise in a.
from 1974 to 1980 for the United Kingdom-the only oil producer in the European sample-likely
reflects the effects ofoil shocks. In 1990, the values of a. are 0.27 for Italy, 0.22 for Spain (this
value corresponds to 1987), 0.186 for Germany, 0.139 for France, and 0.122 for the United
Kingdom.

Other Countries
The evidence on convergence across regions within a country has been substantial. The
main point ofmost ofthe studies is that there is regio~al convergence in almost any country
analyzed and that the speed ofconvergence is close to 2 percent per year (some countries display
faster and some countries display slower speed of convergence, but it always lies close to the two
percent.) Among others, the countries studied are Canada (see Coulombe and Lee [1993]),
Australia (see Cashin [1995a]), India (see Cashin [1995b]), China (see Rivera-Batiz [1994]),
Sweden (see Persson [1994]), Austria, East Germany (see Keller [1994]) and Spain (see Dolado,
Gonzalez-Paramo and Roldan [1994].).

7. Conclusions.

There are four main lessons to be gained from the classical convergence literature. First,
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the cross-country distribution ofworld GDP between 1960 and 1990 did not shrink, and poor
countries do not grow faster than rich ones. Using the classical terminology, in our world there is
no a-convergence and there is no absolute P-convergence. Second, holding constant variables
that could proxy for the steady state ofthe various economies, the same sample of 110 economies
displays a negative partial correlation between growth and the initial level ofGDP, a phenomenon
called conditional P-convergence. Interestingly, the estimated speed ofconditional convergence
is close to 2 percent per year. Third, the sample ofOECD economies converge in an absolute
sense at a speed which is also close to 2 percent per year. The sample of countries displays a
convergence over the same period. However, the process ofa-convergence did seem to stop for
about a decade somewhere in the mid-1970s. Fourth, the regions within the United States, Japan,
Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, and other countries display absolute and
conditional P-convergence, as well as a-convergence. The estimated speed ofconvergence is, in
all cases, close to 2 percent per year. As for the OECD economies, within most ofthese countries

the process ofa-convergence also seemed to stop for about a decade somewhere in the mid1970s.
I would like to finish this paper with four thoughts about these results. First, we have seen
that something strange happened in the mid-1970s all over the world: the process of a
convergence in most data sets that displayed a-convergence, stopped for about a decade. In
other words, income inequality within the countries studied, increased for a while. While the evil
policies ofRonald Reagan were blamed for this increase in income inequality in the United States,
the President cannot be blamed for the existence ofthe same phenomenon within Japan, within
European countries or across OECD economies. A more reasonable theory would point in the
22

direction oftechnological shocks that increased the productivity ofthe high-wage (educated)
workers.
Second, the speed of convergence,

P, has been estimated to be within a narrow range of

two percent per year (P=0.02). Although this is a very robust and strongly significant finding, I
would like to emphasize that a speed of2 percent per year is very small. For example, it suggests
that it will take 35 years for halfofthe distance between the initial level ofincome and the steady
state to vanish. This is quite slow.
Third, the estimate of p=0.02 and equation (4) can be used to provide estimates ofthe
relevant capital share, a. If we let x=O. 02 (the rate ofproductivity growth must be equal to the
long-run growth rate of an economy, which is close to 0.02), n=0.01 (the estimated rate of
population growth in recent decades), and 6=0.05 (this rate ofdepreciation is more controversial;
0. 05 corresponds to the rate ofdepreciation for the overall stock of structures and equipment for
the United States), then the capital share implied by the estimated p=0.02 is a=O. 75. This capital
share is larger than the traditional a=0.30 estimated under the assumptions ofno externalities and
no human capital. A value of a=O. 75 suggests that, even though the neoclassical model is
qualitatively consistent with the data, from a quantitative point ofview, it tends to predict too
high a speed of conditional convergence. For the model to be consistent with the slow speed of2
percent per year, it needs to be amended so that the relevant capital share is larger. 20
Finally, in this paper I followed the classical convergence literature and analyzed the
empirical results in the light ofthe neoclassical model. As I said in the text, early theorists of
20

See Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1992] and Mankiw, Romer and Weil [1992] who amend
the neoclassical model to incorporate human capital. This amendment effectively increases the
relevant capital share to a number consistent with the estimated speed ofconvergence.
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endogenous growth proposed the absence ofabsolute P-convergence as the main piece of
evidence in favor oftheir models and against neoclassical growth. The introduction ofthe
concept of conditional convergence showed that the neoclassical model is consistent with the data
so it can be a useful framework to guide the convergence literature. However, this is not to say
that no other models may be consistent with the existence of convergence also. For example, it
can be shown that a model ofendogenous growth and technological diffusion can predict
equation exactly like (4) (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995, chapter 8]) and that the two-sector
models ofendogenous growth may also be consistent with the empirical evidence (Barro and
Sala-i-Martin [1995, chapter 5].)
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TABLE 1: Estimates of the Speeds of P-Convergence for a Variety of Data Sets
Long-Run
Single Regression (*)

Long-Run
Single Regression (*)

Panel
Estimates (*)

(1)
Absolute Convergence

(2)
Conditional
Convergence

(3)
Conditional
Convergence

World
- 110 Countries
(1960-1990)

-0.004
0.04
(0.002) [0.0176]

0.013
0.46
(0.004) [0.0134]

- OECD Countries
(1960-1990)

0.014
0.48
(0.003) [0.0062]

0.029
0.78
(0.008) [0.0050]

United States
-48 States
(1880-1990)

0.021
0.89
(0.0003) [0.0015]

0.017
0.89
(0.002) [0.0015]

0.022
(0.002)

DATASET

0.025
(0.0028)

--

---

-

Japan
- 47 Prefectures
(1955-1990)

0.019
0.59
(0.003) [0.0027]

0.59 ·
0.019
(0.004) [0.0027]

0.031
(0.004)

Europe Total (**)
-90 Regions
(1950-1990)

0.015
0.51
(0.002) [0.0030]

0.015
0.52
(0.002) [0.0030]

0.018
(0.003)

Germany
(11 Regions)

0.014
0.56
(0.006) [0.0028]

0.014
0.55
(0.005) [0.0027]

0.016
(0.006)

---

United Kingdom
(11 Regions)

0.020
0.62
(0.008) [0.0021]

0.030
0.61
(0.007) [0.0021]

0.029
(0.009)

--

France
(21 regions)

0.016
0.55
(0.005) [0.0023]

0.016
0.55
(0.004) [0.0022]

0.015
(0.003)

---

Italy
(20 Regions)

0.010
0.46
(0.003) [0.0033]

0.010
0.46
(0.003) [0.0031]

0.016
(0.003)

--

Spain
(17 Regions)
(1955-1987)

0.021
0.63
(0.005) [0.0042]

0.023
0.63
(0.007) [0.0040]

0.019
(0.005)

-
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Notes to Table 1:
(*) The regressions use non-linear least squares to estimate equations of the form:
(lil'}ln(y/y;,t..rJ = a- [ln(y;,t..rJl(J-e·/11')(Jil') + "other variables",

where Yt,t-T is the per capita income in country or region i at the beginning of the interval divided by the overall
CPI. Tis the length of the interval; "other variables" are regional dummies and sectoral variables that hold
constant temporary shocks that may affect the performance of a region in a manner that is correlated with the
initial level ofincome (recall that when the error term is correlated with the explanatory variable, then the
OLS estimate of pis biased).
Each column contains four numbers. The first one is the estimate of p. Underneath it, in
parentheses, its standard error. To its right, the adjusted R2 of the regression and below the R2, the standard
error of the regression. Thus, constant, regional dummies and/or structural variables are not reported in the
Table.
The coefficients for Europe Total include one dummy for each of the eight countries.
Columns 1 and 2 report the value of pestimated from a single cross section using the longest
available data. Column 1 reports the coefficient when the ONLY variable held constant is the initial level of
income. Column 2 reports the value of pe.~timated when additional variables are held constant
Column 3 reports the panel estimates when all the subperiods are assumed to have the same
coefficient p. This estimation allows for time effects. For most countries, the restriction of Pbeing constant
over the subperiods cannot be rejected (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995].)
(**) The Regressions for Europe Total allow for each country to have its own constant term.
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Figure 2: Dispersion of GDP Across 110 Countries
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Figure 4: Convergence of Personal Income across U.S. States.
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